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THE SIXTH AMENDMENT SENTENCING RIGHT 
AND ITS REMEDY* 
CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK** 
The Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine recognizes the right to a jury trial of 
facts that increase criminal sentences. The doctrine has had only a minimal effect 
on sentencing because subsequent cases crafting a remedy largely undermined the 
right. The remedial cases have undermined the Sixth Amendment sentencing 
right in three notable ways: (1) by repeatedly refusing to recognize that district 
courts possess an unfettered power to sentence based on nothing more than a 
policy disagreement; (2) by encouraging appellate court judges to review 
sentences in a manner that is designed to curtail district court discretion; and 
(3) by refusing to require district court judges to engage in any independent 
sentencing analysis. Although the Supreme Court has justified its remedy by 
reference to historical sentencing practices, these three choices in its remedial 
cases represent significant departures from historical practice. What is more, the 
current remedy fails to vindicate the interests protected by the Sixth 
Amendment—the liberty interests of criminal defendants and democratic input 
into individual criminal cases. Until and unless the Court revisits its remedial 
decisions, the Sixth Amendment sentencing right will continue to be little more 
than a meaningless formalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Apprendi v. New Jersey1 ushered in a new doctrine of constitutional criminal 
procedure: the right to a jury trial of facts that increase criminal sentences. In 
the twenty years since Apprendi was decided, the Supreme Court has heard more 
than a dozen cases that further develop the Sixth Amendment sentencing 
doctrine.2 But the doctrine has not resulted in a system in which juries actually 
decide sentencing facts beyond a reasonable doubt with any regularity. 
Especially in the federal system, the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine has 
increased the authority of judges, but it has largely failed to protect the rights 
of defendants. 
Not only has the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine not resulted in 
more jury trials, but the doctrine also has been largely hollowed out in a number 
of cases decided after Apprendi—cases that crafted a remedy for violations of the 
Sixth Amendment sentencing right. Specifically, by creating an “advisory” 
federal sentencing guideline system, the Supreme Court has dramatically 
undermined the Sixth Amendment sentencing right. The Court has recalibrated 
that federal remedy to encourage particular sentencing outcomes3 and, in so 
doing, has permitted practices that its earlier Sixth Amendment sentencing 
cases seemingly prohibit. Put simply, the Supreme Court has allowed its 
remedy to undermine the Sixth Amendment sentencing right. 
The tension between the right and the remedy can be traced to two 
choices—the choice to preserve an important role for the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (“Guidelines”), and the choice to embrace history as a justification 
for, but not a limitation on, the remedy. In attempting to preserve a central role 
for the Guidelines, the Court has significantly weakened the Sixth Amendment 
sentencing right. The Court appears to require judges not only to make the 
factual findings required by the Guidelines but also to make additional factual 
findings in order to deviate from the Guidelines’ sentencing range—a 
 
 1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2019) (plurality opinion); Chavez-
Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1967–68 (2018); Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
1897, 1911 (2018); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1349 (2016); Alleyne v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 99, 114–15 (2013); Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 544 (2013); S. Union Co. v. 
United States, 567 U.S. 343, 360 (2012); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 504–05 (2011); Dillon 
v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 830 (2010); Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (per 
curium); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009) (per curium); Irizarry v. United States, 
553 U.S. 708, 716 (2008); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 293 (2007); Gall v. United States, 
552 U.S. 38, 59–60 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007); Rita v. United States, 
551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007). 
 3. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 550 (“The Booker remedy was designed, and has been subsequently 
calibrated, to exploit precisely this distinction: It is intended to promote sentencing uniformity while 
avoiding a Sixth Amendment violation.”). 
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requirement that is forbidden by the early cases establishing the Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine.4 
The Supreme Court relied on history to justify the remedy that it 
adopted—specifically, it relied on a long history of judges making factual 
findings in aid of their independent sentencing decisions. But the Court has 
failed to use that history as a guide or as a constraint when it has refined that 
remedy in subsequent cases. As a result of this failure, the Court’s remedy has 
become entirely unmoored from its original justification, and the Court has 
permitted or endorsed sentencing practices that look nothing like the practices 
it used to initially justify the remedy. Indeed, at this point, federal sentencing 
more closely resembles the mandatory sentencing practices that have been 
deemed unconstitutional than the unstructured sentencing that the Court relied 
on in claiming that advisory sentencing guidelines satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly describes the rise of 
structured sentencing in the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s initial 
articulation of the Sixth Amendment sentencing right in Apprendi, and the 
Court’s subsequent expansion of that right. Part II turns from the right to the 
remedy. It explains how three key features of the remedy—the unwillingness 
to recognize district courts’ authority to sentence based on policy disagreements 
with the Guidelines, the Guidelines-centric nature of appellate review, and the 
failure to ensure district courts are exercising independent sentencing 
judgment—undermine the Sixth Amendment sentencing right. Part III 
highlights the strange role that history has played in the crafting of the Sixth 
Amendment remedy—namely that history has served as a justification for, but 
not a limitation on, the remedy. Part III explains that the three features of the 
remedy discussed in Part II represent departures from historical practice. It also 
explains how the current remedy fails to vindicate the interests protected by the 
Sixth Amendment—the liberty interests of criminal defendants and democratic 
input in individual criminal cases. Indeed, to a certain extent, the current system 
undermines those principles. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT SENTENCING RIGHT 
For much of American history, criminal statutes identified broad ranges 
of punishment, and judges were free to impose a punishment from anywhere 
within that range.5 For example, a state might criminalize assault and make the 
 
 4. See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 293; Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004). 
 5. The early history of sentencing in the United States—in particular, when sentencing switched 
from a system of determinate sentences to a system that gave sentencing discretion to judges—is a 
matter of some dispute. Compare Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (“[B]oth before and 
since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy 
under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence 
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violation of that law punishable by up to five years in prison. When a defendant 
was convicted of assault, the judge in that case decided whether to impose a 
sentence of no incarceration, five years of incarceration, or something in 
between. 
The precise sentence in a particular case was left almost entirely to the 
discretion of judges.6 The judge was tasked with finding any facts relevant to 
the defendant’s sentence—such as whether the defendant had committed 
previous crimes or how much harm the victim suffered. The judge was also 
responsible for deciding how those facts ought to affect the sentence.7 The judge 
had to decide for example, whether an eighteen-year-old defendant should serve 
a lengthy sentence because young people are more likely to reoffend, or whether 
the defendant should serve a shorter sentence because young people are less 
culpable for their crimes. Finally, judges’ sentencing decisions were usually 
exempted from any meaningful appellate review.8 
Importantly, the judge was not the only official who played a significant 
role in deciding a defendant’s punishment. When defendants were sentenced to 
incarceration, they rarely served the full sentence that the judge imposed.9 
Instead, they were periodically assessed by parole officials who would release 
 
used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed 
by law.”), and KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9 (1998) (“From the beginning of the Republic, federal judges were 
entrusted with wide sentencing discretion.”), with Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The 
New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 892 (1990) (“[U]p through 
1870, legislators retained most of the discretionary power over criminal sentencing. . . . [T]he period 
of incarceration was generally prescribed with specificity by the legislature.”), and Note, The 
Admissibility of Character Evidence in Determining Sentence, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 715–16 (1942) 
(“During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries American criminal legislation has shifted from the 
fixed sentence type of criminal statute to the discretionary sentence type of statute.” (footnote 
omitted)). But everyone seems to agree that discretionary sentencing was the norm by the late 
nineteenth century. 
 6. For an excellent historical account of judicial sentencing discretion and how judges wielded 
that discretion, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 9–29. 
 7. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & William W. Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst, 
66 UCLA L. REV. 448, 474 (2019) (explaining that before the rise of structured sentencing, judges 
“enjoyed the ability to make factual findings in aid of their sentencing decisions” because “people 
believed that it was impossible to identify ex ante those facts that ought to increase or decrease 
sentences”—a task that was also left to judicial discretion). 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 147–60. 
 9. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT., TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 2 (1999) (“In the early 1970’s, States generally 
permitted parole boards to determine when an offender would be released from prison. In addition, 
good-time reductions for satisfactory prison behavior, earned-time incentives for participation in work 
or educational programs, and other time reductions to control prison crowding resulted in the early 
release of prisoners. These policies permitted officials to individualize the amount of punishment or 
leniency an offender received and provided means to manage the prison population.”). 
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defendants back into the community when it appeared that they had been 
sufficiently rehabilitated.10 
Over time, the discretion that judges enjoyed at sentencing came under 
attack. Driven by concerns about the disparities resulting from highly 
discretionary sentencing practices—which dovetailed with concerns about 
increasing crime rates and broad criticisms of the rehabilitative model of 
punishment—criminal justice experts and scholars proposed reforms to bring 
greater consistency and certainty to the sentencing enterprise.11 
Federal sentencing reform focused heavily on curtailing judicial 
sentencing discretion. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”)12 created a 
sentencing commission to develop mandatory guidelines that limited the 
available sentencing range in particular cases.13 The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines assign narrow sentencing ranges within the broader statutory 
sentencing limits based on a number of factual variables, including the offense 
of conviction, the factual circumstances surrounding the offense, and the 
defendant’s prior criminal convictions.14 Judges were permitted to sentence 
outside the Guidelines range only in a few situations expressly permitted by the 
Guidelines15 or where the sentencing judge found that a circumstance had not 
been “taken into consideration” when the Guidelines were drafted.16 
The federal government was hardly unique in its decision to adopt 
structured sentencing mechanisms. Some states developed their own sentencing 
guidelines, while others adopted presumptive sentencing regimes.17 In those 
presumptive systems, legislatures or sentencing commissions identified a 
narrow presumptive sentence for the “ordinary case” of a given crime. Judges 
retained the power to sentence above or below the presumptive sentence in an 
 
 10. Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 958, 976–87 (2013) (describing the history of and rationale behind parole in America). 
 11. For examples of such proposed reforms, see MODEL SENT’G & CORR. ACT § 3 (UNIF. L. 
COMM’N 1979); DAVID FOGEL, “. . . WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF . . .”: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR 
CORRECTIONS 193–99 (2d ed. 1975); PIERCE O’DONNELL, MICHAEL J. CHURGIN & DENNIS E. 
CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE 
REFORM 96–127 (1977); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT: REPORT 
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING 15–34 (1976). 
 12. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 
28 U.S.C.). 
 13. Id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2017–20 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994). 
 14. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2), (c), (d). 
 15. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (identifying 
appropriate and inappropriate grounds for departure). 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 102–03 (noting that 
before United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), this provision severely hampered district court 
ability to sentence below the Guidelines range). 
 17. See John F. Pfaff, The Future of Appellate Sentencing Review: Booker in the States, 93 MARQ. L. 
REV. 683, 688 (2009) (discussing different types of sentencing reforms in the states). 
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unusual case, but those sentencing decisions were subject to appellate review.18 
Examples of such systems include Arizona, California, and Washington, which 
created presumptive, mitigated, and aggravated sentences.19 
Mandatory sentencing guidelines and presumptive sentencing systems 
were adopted only by a minority of jurisdictions.20 Other jurisdictions curtailed 
judicial sentencing discretion through the use of mandatory minimum 
sentences. Some jurisdictions simply created new crimes with statutory 
mandatory minimum sentences. Whatever factual circumstance warranted the 
mandatory minimum sentence was included as an element of the new offense.21 
But creating new crimes was not the only approach to imposing mandatory 
sentences. Other systems treated the fact or facts triggering a mandatory 
minimum sentence purely as a sentencing matter to be decided by a judge by a 
preponderance of the evidence, rather than as an element of a new crime.22 
Sentencing reform in the late twentieth century not only curtailed the 
authority of judges but also affected parole. The federal system23 and some 
states24 abandoned parole altogether in the name of “truth in sentencing.”25 And 
those states that retained parole changed their laws so that many crimes were 
either no longer parole eligible or required defendants to serve lengthy 
mandatory sentences before becoming eligible.26 
When first confronted with these developments in the 1980s, the Supreme 
Court gave them its blessing. It upheld the Guidelines against a separation of 
powers attack in Mistretta v. United States.27 And in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,28 
it rejected due process and Sixth Amendment challenges to so-called sentencing 
 
 18. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Reform in the States: An Overview of the Colorado Law Review 
Symposium, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 645, 647 n.10 (1993). The presumptive sentence often depends not 
only on the offense of conviction but also on an offender’s prior record of convictions. 
 19. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-604, 13-702 (Westlaw through end of the 48th Leg., 1st 
Reg. Sess. 2007); CAL. R. CT. 4.420 (Westlaw 2006) (amended 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.94A.535 (Westlaw 2002); see also Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 276–77 (2007) 
(describing the California system). 
 20. See Pfaff, supra note 17, at 688–89 (explaining that only eighteen states adopted structured 
sentencing systems that “set default sentences or ranges from which a judge cannot depart (either up 
or down) without making some sort of additional factual finding,” though others adopted voluntary 
guidelines that “judges are simply encouraged, not required, to follow”). 
 21. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 236–37 (1999) (collecting examples of states 
that created a new offense, “aggravated robbery,” which required the defendant to have caused serious 
bodily injury, an element that was not required to convict for ordinary robbery). 
 22. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 8, 1982, Act No. 1982-54, 1982 Pa. Laws 169 (codified as amended at 42 
PA. CONST. STAT. § 9712 (Westlaw 1982)). 
 23. Doherty, supra note 10, at 995–96. 
 24. Kevin R. Reitz, Prison-Release Reform and American Decarceration, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2741, 
2747 (2020) (noting that from 1972 to 2007 “sixteen states abolished parole-release discretion”). 
 25. See DITTON & WILSON, supra note 9, at 1. 
 26. Reitz, supra note 24, at 2752. 
 27. 488 U.S. 361 (1989); id. at 371, 374. 
 28. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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factors.29 The challenge in McMillan involved a state statute that imposed a 
five-year mandatory minimum sentence on defendants convicted of certain 
felonies if they possessed a firearm during the commission of their offense. 
Whether the defendant possessed a firearm was, according to the statute, to be 
determined by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence.30 That is to say, 
the possession of a firearm was not considered an element to be proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather, it was only a factor for the judge to 
consider at sentencing in determining whether the mandatory minimum 
applied. The Supreme Court deferred to the Pennsylvania legislature’s decision 
to alter the range of punishment by creating a statutory sentencing factor rather 
than by making possession of the firearm either a new element of the crime or 
a new offense.31 The Court further held that there is no jury trial right to 
sentencing, even when a sentence turns on finding a specific fact.32 
Fewer than fifteen years after affirming the constitutionality of sentencing 
factors in McMillan, the Supreme Court changed course. In Apprendi, the Court 
said these sentencing practices were limited by the Sixth Amendment.33 
Apprendi was the first time the Court ruled these practices unconstitutional, but 
it had signaled its concerns about altering a defendant’s sentencing range based 
on judicial fact-finding the previous year in Jones v. United States.34 Jones raised 
the question whether a federal carjacking statute—which increased the statutory 
maximum punishment if the defendant caused serious bodily injury or death—
created new federal crimes or merely new sentencing factors. Writing for the 
majority, Justice Souter explained that increasing the statutory maximum 
sentence based on judge-found facts raised serious constitutional questions, 
including questions regarding the defendant’s right to a jury trial.35 To avoid 
those questions, the Court elected to construe the statute as creating new federal 
crimes rather than new federal sentencing factors.36 
The questions the Court avoided in Jones were squarely presented in 
Apprendi. Apprendi involved a state statutory sentencing enhancement similar to 
the sentencing factor at issue in McMillan. But unlike McMillian, the 
enhancement in Apprendi increased the maximum sentence for defendants, 
rather than imposing a mandatory minimum sentence. The enhancement 
applied to defendants convicted of the unlawful possession of a firearm if they 
 
 29. Id. at 91, 93. 
 30. Act of Mar. 8, 1982, Act No. 1982-54, 1982 Pa. Laws 169 (codified as amended at 42 PA. 
CONST. STAT. § 9712 (Westlaw 1982)); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81. 
 31. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85–86. 
 32. Id. at 93. 
 33. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). 
 34. 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 35. Id. at 240–51. 
 36. Id. at 251–52. 
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possessed the firearm in order to intimidate someone because of their race.37 
That factual finding—whether the defendant committed the crime to intimidate 
the victim based on race—was decided by the sentencing judge using a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.38 The Apprendi Court struck down the 
statute. It held that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the statutory maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to a 
jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt.39 
In striking down the New Jersey statute, the Apprendi Court cast doubt on 
McMillan, which had affirmed the constitutionality of statutory sentencing 
factors involving judicial fact-finding. The Apprendi Court characterized the 
“distinction between ‘elements’ and ‘sentencing factors’” as “constitutionally 
novel and elusive.”40 The Court elected to distinguish between elements (which 
require jury fact-finding) and sentencing factors (which do not) by focusing on 
the effect of the statutory punishment enhancement. The Apprendi Court stated, 
“the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does the required finding 
expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s 
guilty verdict?”41 Applying this “effect over form” framework to the New Jersey 
statute, the Court concluded that “the effect of New Jersey’s sentencing 
‘enhancement’ here is unquestionably to turn a second-degree offense into a 
first-degree offense, under the State’s own criminal code.”42 
Put simply, Apprendi stated that whether a fact is an element, and thus 
subject to the Sixth Amendment, turns on what that fact does. If a fact increases 
the statutory maximum sentence by reclassifying a crime under the state’s 
criminal code, then the fact is the functional equivalent of an element. But if a 
fact merely “supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s 
finding,” then it is a sentencing factor, and the Sixth Amendment does not 
apply.43 
 
 37. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468–69. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 476. The Apprendi Court exempted previous convictions from its ruling because two 
years before, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), it had held that prior 
convictions that increase punishments need not be submitted to a jury or proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. at 239. 
 40. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 494 n.19 (“This is not to suggest that the term ‘sentencing factor’ is devoid of meaning. 
The term appropriately describes a circumstance, which may be either aggravating or mitigating in 
character, that supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s finding that the 
defendant is guilty of a particular offense. On the other hand, when the term ‘sentence enhancement’ 
is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict. Indeed, 
it fits squarely within the usual definition of an ‘element’ of the offense.”). 
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Apprendi was groundbreaking in its establishment of the Sixth Amendment 
sentencing doctrine. But when that doctrine was first announced, the 
importance of the ruling was not immediately clear. Because the Court limited 
the rule announced in Apprendi to increases in statutory maximum sentences, 
the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine did not appear to reach sentencing 
guidelines. But Ring v. Arizona44 expanded the Sixth Amendment sentencing 
doctrine beyond statutory maxima—and in doing so, ensured that the doctrine 
would have a much broader effect.45 
Ring involved a Sixth Amendment challenge to Arizona’s capital 
sentencing regime. Arizona law permitted the imposition of the death penalty 
only in the presence of certain aggravating circumstances, and it assigned the 
task of finding those aggravating circumstances to the trial judge, not the jury.46 
Because the relevant statute said that the maximum penalty was death,47 the 
new rule announced in Apprendi arguably did not apply. The judge was merely 
choosing whether to impose the maximum sentence of death or a lesser 
sentence. Indeed, the Supreme Court had said as much in Apprendi when it 
explained why the rule it announced was not foreclosed by a prior decision 
upholding the Arizona death penalty regime against constitutional attack.48 
But the Ring Court rejected that reading of Apprendi. It relied on language 
from Apprendi indicating that the relevant constitutional question was whether 
the judicial fact finding increased the sentence a defendant could receive above 
the maximum sentence she could receive if he were “punished according to the 
facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.”49 Because a judge could legally impose 
the death penalty only after finding one or more aggravating factors identified 
in the statute, the Court concluded that those “enumerated aggravating factors 
operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.’”50 And 
thus the Sixth Amendment applied. 
It bears emphasizing that Ring could have gone the other way. Unlike the 
New Jersey statute in Apprendi, the statute at issue in Ring explicitly stated that 
the maximum punishment for first-degree murder was death. The Supreme 
 
 44. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 45. See JOHN F. PFAFF, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 322 (2016) (stating that Ring clarified 
that Apprendi was not “a drafting rule” and as a result, “Ring would prove to be the intellectual forebear 
of Blakely”); Hessick & Berry, supra note 7, at 455–56 (explaining how Ring expanded the rule from 
Apprendi, but that expansion was not acknowledged until Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)). 
 46. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 592–93 (describing the Arizona capital sentencing system). 
 47. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(C) (Westlaw 2001). 
 48. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 (“[O]nce a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements 
of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge to 
decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed.” (quoting 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 257 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted))). 
 49. Ring, 536 U.S. at 588–89 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483). 
 50. Id. at 609 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19). 
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Court could have distinguished the statute in Ring from the statute in Apprendi 
on those grounds. But, once again, the Court focused on the effect of the statute, 
not merely what the statute said. Life in prison was the maximum penalty that 
Timothy Ring could receive based on his conviction alone.51 Unless and until 
the judge found an aggravating circumstance, the judge could not sentence him 
to death. And this, according to the Ring Court, violated the Sixth 
Amendment.52 
An acknowledgment of the full effect of Ring—and arguably the high-
water mark of the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine—came soon after in 
Blakely v. Washington.53 Decided only four years after Apprendi and two years 
after Ring, Blakely extended the Sixth Amendment sentencing right to 
sentencing guidelines. The Blakely Court held that mandatory sentencing 
guidelines can violate the Sixth Amendment if a judge’s sentencing discretion 
is limited to a range narrower than the statutory range and if the sentencing 
range can increase only if the sentencing court makes factual findings. The 
Blakely Court explained that mandatory guidelines fell within the Apprendi rule 
because “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict 
or admitted by the defendant.”54 The Blakely Court went on to clarify that 
the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may 
impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts 
punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not 
found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the punishment,” 
and the judge exceeds his proper authority.55 
Blakely did not merely acknowledge the full effect of the Ring decision. It 
also expanded the doctrine beyond what the Court had previously set forth in 
Apprendi and Ring. In particular, it no longer relied, as an analytical matter, on 
the analogy to statutory elements that created new, aggravated crimes. That 
analogy worked in both Apprendi and Ring because those cases involved 
sentencing factors that were specifically identified in statutes. Those identified 
factors increased the maximum available sentence, and so the Apprendi and Ring 
Courts said that the factors operated as the functional equivalent of an element. 
But the state sentencing scheme at issue in Blakely did not limit judges to a finite 
list of aggravating factors. The list that appeared in the statute was “illustrative 
 
 51. Id. at 597 (“Based solely on the jury’s verdict finding Ring guilty of first-degree felony 
murder, the maximum punishment he could have received was life imprisonment.”). 
 52. Id. at 609. 
 53. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 54. Id. at 303. 
 55. Id. at 303–04 (citation omitted) (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1866)). 
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only and . . . not intended to be exclusive.”56 In other words, judges had to find 
aggravating factors in order to impose a higher sentence, but judges could also 
decide what those factors could be. 
It is difficult to analogize this abstract fact-finding requirement to an 
element of a crime. Indeed, if a legislature enacted a criminal statute that 
imposed additional punishment on people who did something “aggravating” or 
“exceptional,” the courts might strike down such a statute as unconstitutionally 
vague.57 Rather than resembling an element of a crime, the idea that sentences 
on the higher end of the statutory range should be imposed only when there are 
“substantial and compelling reasons”58 to do so seems like common sense. 
Indeed, that is presumably why legislatures enact criminal statutes with 
statutory ranges rather than single, fixed penalties—to permit judges to impose 
sentences at or near the top of the statutory range for those defendants who do 
things that make their crimes seem worse and lower sentences for those 
defendants who do not. 
But the Blakely Court decided that any fact-finding requirement triggered 
the Sixth Amendment, regardless whether particular, previously determined 
facts had to be found. Imagine, for example, a statute said that judges should 
impose sentences above the presumptive range only if they first find 
“aggravating facts,” and the statutes gave a nonexhaustive list of three 
aggravating facts—whether the defendant used a gun, whether the victim 
suffered a physical injury, and whether the defendant had previously been 
convicted of the same crime. In this hypothetical regime, a particular judge 
could decide that committing a crime in the presence of a minor is also an 
aggravating fact and then impose a sentence above the presumptive range on a 
specific defendant after finding that the defendant had committed the crime in 
front of a child. Following Blakely, such a sentence violates the Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine because it requires additional fact-finding: 
 
 56. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390 (Westlaw 2000). 
 57. It is possible, but by no means certain, that such an element would be deemed 
unconstitutionally vague. While the Court has sometimes deemed qualitative standards impermissibly 
vague, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983), it has also rejected vagueness challenges to 
such standards, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279–80 (1984). The Court’s cases in this area are 
simply not consistent. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal Clear Statement Rules, 
97 WASH. U. L. REV. 351, 371–72 (2019) (noting the inconsistency between United States v. L. Cohen 
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921), and Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913)). And the Court has 
recently stated that qualitative standards, standing alone, are not enough to render a statute 
unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 603–04 (2015) (“As a general 
matter, we do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a qualitative 
standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct . . . .”). 
 58. State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149, 157 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (“Under the [Washington sentencing 
system], a trial court must impose a sentence within the standard range for the offense unless the court 
finds substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.”), rev’d sub nom. Blakely, 
542 U.S. 296. 
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Whether the judge’s authority to impose an enhanced sentence depends 
on finding a specified fact (as in Apprendi), one of several specified facts 
(as in Ring), or any aggravating fact (as here), it remains the case that the 
jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the sentence. The judge acquires 
that authority only upon finding some additional fact.59 
Following Blakely, it was clear that the Sixth Amendment sentencing 
doctrine had fundamentally undermined the constitutionality of structured 
sentencing, including the Guidelines.60 Because the Guidelines required judges 
to find facts in order to determine the applicable Guidelines range, the federal 
system clearly violated the rule articulated in Ring and Blakely—that a jury must 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, facts that increase a defendant’s sentencing 
exposure. And so, the Supreme Court found that the mandatory Guidelines 
were unconstitutional in United States v. Booker.61 
Notably, the Guidelines were not mandatory in all circumstances. Judges 
were permitted to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range if they found 
“that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a 
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission 
in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 
described.”62 But the Booker majority dismissed this authority to sentence 
outside the Guidelines because it was “not available in every case, and in fact 
[was] unavailable in most.”63 Because judges were required to sentence within 
the Guidelines in a “run-of-the-mill” case, the Court deemed the Guidelines’ 
mandatory rules that increased criminal penalties based on judicial fact-
finding.64 
The Supreme Court confirmed that any required fact-finding by judges 
violated the Sixth Amendment doctrine in Cunningham v. California.65 That case 
involved California’s statutory sentencing system which, like the Washington 
system at issue in Blakely, was a presumptive sentencing system.66 Despite that 
key similarity, the Supreme Court of California relied on the intervening 
 
 59. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305. 
 60. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Guidelines Are Dead! Long Live Sentencing 
Guidelines!, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (June 25, 2004, 12:43 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/ 
sentencing_law_and_policy/2004/06/sentencing_guid.html [https://perma.cc/9FZM-LEVK] (“The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely seems to mean that the standard operating procedures for most 
sentencing guideline systems—including those of the federal sentencing guidelines—are no longer 
constitutionally sound.”). 
 61. 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (merits majority). 
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). 
 63. Booker, 543 U.S. at 234. 
 64. Id. at 235. 
 65. 549 U.S. 270 (2007). 
 66. See supra text accompanying notes 17–19; see also Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 277–79 (describing 
the California system). 
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decision in Booker to decide that its sentencing system had survived Blakely.67 
The unusual remedy the U.S. Supreme Court had adopted in Booker had created 
confusion about what sort of judicial sentencing discretion could avoid 
triggering the Sixth Amendment—an issue that I take up at some length below. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of California. 
While declining to further clarify the amount of discretion that federal judges 
enjoyed in the wake of Booker, the Cunningham Court reiterated that because 
the California system required judges to make factual findings in order to 
increase sentences, it violated the rule set out in Blakely.68 In so holding, the 
Court rejected Justice Alito’s contention in dissent that, as the majority put it, 
“a policy judgment, or even a judge’s ‘subjective belief’ regarding the 
appropriate sentence, qualifies as an aggravating circumstance” under the 
California system.69 The majority pointed to statutory language making clear 
that the term “circumstances in aggravation” was defined as “facts which justify 
the imposition of the upper prison term.”70 
Since deciding Blakely and Cunningham, the Court has, on several 
occasions, further expanded the doctrine. The doctrine, as originally 
formulated, initially applied only to increases in the maximum punishment; it 
did not forbid the adoption of sentencing factors that triggered a mandatory 
minimum sentence.71 But in Alleyne v. United States,72 the Court extended the 
doctrine to mandatory minimum punishments as well, holding that any factual 
finding that increases the required minimum punishment also must be proven 
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Alleyne was not the first case to address whether the rule from Apprendi 
applied to mandatory minimum sentences. The Court took up the question two 
years after Apprendi in Harris v. United States.73 The Harris Court refused to 
apply the rule from Apprendi to mandatory minimum sentences. The Court 
justified its decision on several grounds. First, it noted that Apprendi had relied 
on the distinction between maximum and minimum sentences in reconciling its 
holding with McMillan.74 Second, it noted that the mandatory minimum was 
already within the range of permissible sentencing without any additional fact-
finding, and so defendants did not have a right to be sentenced below the 
mandatory minimum.75 
 
 67. People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534, 536 (Cal. 2005), overruled by Cunningham, 549 U.S. 270. 
 68. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 288–89. 
 69. Id. at 279 (citing id. at 307–08 (Alito, J., dissenting)). 
 70. Id. (quoting CAL. R. CT. 4.405(d) (Westlaw 2006) (amended 2007)). 
 71. E.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002), overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 
570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
 72. 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
 73. 536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled by Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99. 
 74. Id. at 562–65. 
 75. Id. at 566. 
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The Alleyne Court rejected this analysis and overruled Harris. It reframed 
the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine as a simple test: “Any fact that, by 
law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to 
the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”76 The Court then explained that 
adding or increasing a mandatory minimum sentence is an increase in the 
penalty for that crime because it “alter[s] the prescribed range of sentences to 
which a defendant is exposed . . . in a manner that aggravates the punishment.”77 
The Alleyne Court bolstered this conclusion with historical evidence.78 It also 
stated that its new rule would allow defendants to predict their sentencing range 
based on the charges in an indictment, and it would “preserve[] the historic role 
of the jury as an intermediary between the State and criminal defendants.”79 
The Supreme Court has also applied the Sixth Amendment sentencing 
doctrine to situations other than the calculation of sentences of incarceration. 
In Southern Union Co. v. United States,80 the Court extended the doctrine to any 
factual findings that are necessary to the calculation of a criminal fine. And in 
United States v. Haymond,81 the Court applied the doctrine to a mandatory 
sentence that was imposed in a supervised-release revocation hearing. 
But at the same time the Court has expanded the Sixth Amendment 
sentencing doctrine, it has also dramatically undercut the doctrine. The biggest 
blow to the doctrine has been the remedy that the Court adopted in Booker. 
That is the subject of the next part. 
II.  UNDERMINING THE RIGHT WITH THE REMEDY 
In United States v. Booker, five Justices agreed that the federal system, 
which was based on mandatory sentencing guidelines, violated the Sixth 
Amendment.82 But a different five-Justice majority determined how to fix the 
problem.83 This remedial majority was unwilling to submit the Guidelines’ 
factual findings to a jury. The remedial majority was concerned that if the Court 
required juries to find sentencing facts, then parties would engage in plea 
bargaining over those facts. Plea bargaining over sentencing facts could lead to 
different sentencing outcomes in cases with similar facts—differences driven by 
lawyers’ negotiating skills rather than differences that ought to drive sentences. 
Because Congress enacted the SRA to reduce sentencing disparities, the 
remedial majority thought that allowing plea bargaining over sentencing facts 
 
 76. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 102 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10, 490 (2000)). 
 77. Id. at 108 (first citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10 (2000); and then citing 
Harris, 536 U.S. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 78. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 108–11. 
 79. Id. at 114 (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1995)). 
 80. 567 U.S. 343 (2012). 
 81. 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (plurality opinion). 
 82. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (merits majority). 
 83. Id. at 244–46 (remedial majority). 
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would be inconsistent with congressional intent.84 Thus, instead of requiring 
federal prosecutors to submit sentencing enhancements to a jury, the remedial 
majority decided to make the Guidelines “advisory,” rather than mandatory.85 
“Advisory” guidelines, the Court explained, would not violate the Sixth 
Amendment right because they “recommended, rather than required, the 
selection of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts.”86 
Sentencing judges had long enjoyed the discretion to select particular sentences 
from within broad statutory ranges, and the Sixth Amendment sentencing cases 
have frequently affirmed that such discretion is constitutional, even though 
judges doubtlessly made factual findings when deciding what sentences to 
impose.87 As a result, the Booker Court reasoned, a system that restored 
sentencing discretion to judges could remedy the Sixth Amendment problem 
with the Guidelines.88 
Of course, giving trial judges sentencing discretion would hardly protect 
against sentencing disparity. If judges could ignore the Guidelines, then they 
could impose the same disparate sentences that they had prior to the SRA. And 
so the remedial majority sought to preserve a central role for the Guidelines. It 
did this by imposing two additional limitations to promote sentencing 
uniformity. First, it required sentencing judges to begin each sentencing by 
calculating the correct Guidelines range. Judges were instructed to “consider” 
that range in selecting a sentence, along with other factors identified in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).89 Those § 3553(a) factors include the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, 
the seriousness of the offense, the need to deter to criminal conduct, and the 
need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. The second 
limitation that the Court imposed was appellate review of sentencing decisions. 
Appellate courts were instructed to reverse “unreasonable” sentences in order 
to “iron out” differences in sentencing decisions.90 
As I have explained elsewhere,91 there is a fundamental tension between 
granting district courts discretion and preserving a central role for the 
 
 84. Id. at 255–58. 
 85. Id. at 245. 
 86. Id. at 233 (merits majority). 
 87. E.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (noting the history of judges’ broad 
discretion in sentencing within statutory limits). 
 88. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 (remedial majority). 
 89. Id. at 259–60. 
 90. Id. at 261–63. 
 91. Carissa Byrne Hessick, A Critical View of the Sentencing Commission’s Recent Recommendations 
To “Strengthen the Guidelines System”, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (2014) (“[T]hese two goals—
adherence to the Guidelines and district court discretion—are fundamentally in tension with one 
another.”); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After Kimbrough, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 717, 741 (2009) [hereinafter Hessick, After Kimbrough] (noting “the precarious balance 
the Court is attempting to strike between district court sentencing discretion and the preservation of 
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Guidelines. The raison d’etre for the Guidelines is to limit district court 
discretion and create sentencing uniformity. The Booker opinion gave little 
guidance regarding how the remedy would strike a balance between these two 
seemingly incompatible goals. But in subsequent decisions, it has become clear 
that the Booker remedy is intended to ensure that most sentences still fall within 
the Guidelines range (or very close to it). What is more, the discretion that 
district court judges have—specifically, their discretion not to follow the 
Guidelines—is not nearly as great as the Booker opinion suggested that it would 
be. 
In tilting the balance of its remedy toward the Guidelines and away from 
district court discretion, the Supreme Court has hollowed out the Sixth 
Amendment sentencing right. Indeed, the Court appears to have created 
tension—if not irreconcilable conflict—with its earlier Sixth Amendment cases. 
As described in more detail below, there are three deeply problematic aspects 
of the post-Booker cases: First, the Court has repeatedly refused to recognize 
that district courts possess an unfettered power to sentence outside of the 
Guidelines range based on nothing more than a policy disagreement. Second, 
the Court has encouraged appellate court judges to review sentences in a 
manner it openly admits is designed to curtail district court discretion in order 
to have more sentences conform to the Guidelines. Third, while the Court has 
repeatedly reversed sentences that incorrectly calculate the Guidelines range, it 
has refused to require district court judges to engage in any independent 
sentencing analysis. 
A. Policy Disagreement 
In two early sentencing cases, the Court made clear that the Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine applied to any factual findings, not merely 
those findings that are identified in the relevant statutes or guidelines. In 
Blakely, the Court said that the Washington sentencing system was 
unconstitutional because it required a judge to make a factual finding in order 
to increase a defendant’s sentence above the presumptive sentencing range.92 In 
Cunningham, the Court indicated that, so long as a judge was free to increase a 
defendant’s sentence based on a policy judgment or the judge’s “subjective 
belief” regarding the appropriate sentence, then the Sixth Amendment did not 
apply.93 
 
some adherence to the Guidelines through appellate review” and describing those goals as being in 
tension with one another); Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing 
Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (“These two objectives—requiring district court discretion and 
cabining that discretion through reasonableness review—are in tension with each other.”). 
 92. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 65–70. 
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Despite these early opinions about the scope of the Sixth Amendment 
sentencing doctrine, in the wake of Booker, the Supreme Court has resisted 
stating that federal judges are always free to sentence above or below the 
Guidelines range based on anything other than factual findings. It is difficult to 
square this resistance with a right that does not permit mandatory judicial fact-
finding to increase sentences. 
The Court first confronted this issue two years after Booker in Kimbrough 
v. United States.94 Kimbrough involved a district court’s authority to sentence a 
defendant outside of the Guidelines range based on a categorical disagreement 
with the policy underlying the crack-cocaine guideline. The government argued 
that the guideline could not be disregarded because it was derived from 
congressional policy.95 The Kimbrough Court rejected that argument, holding 
that district courts have the ability to sentence outside of the Guidelines range 
based on a categorical disagreement with the disparity between crack and 
cocaine. That is to say, district courts were free to base their sentencing 
decisions on policy disagreements with the crack-cocaine guideline as opposed 
to case-specific factual circumstances.96 
Although the Kimbrough Court held that district courts were free to 
sentence outside the Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with the crack-
cocaine guideline, the Court suggested that there might be limits on the ability 
of district courts to impose sentences based on policy disagreements with other 
Guidelines.97 The Court said that district courts were not constrained by the 
crack-to-cocaine sentencing ratio because the crack-cocaine guideline “do[es] 
not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional 
role.”98 In “formulating Guidelines ranges for crack cocaine offenses,” the Court 
elaborated, “the Commission looked to the mandatory minimum sentences . . . 
and did not take account of ‘empirical data and national experience.’”99 The 
Court noted that “in the ordinary case, the Commission’s recommendation of a 
sentencing range will ‘reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might 
achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.’”100 And, in such an ordinary case—that is, in a 
case where the Guidelines in question do “exemplify the Commission’s exercise 
 
 94. 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 95. Id. at 102 (citing Brief for the United States at 16, 25, Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (No. 06-6330)). 
 96. See id. at 109–10. 
 97. See id. at 108–09. Notably, the government’s brief in Kimbrough conceded that “the Guidelines 
‘are now advisory’ and that, as a general matter, ‘courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely 
on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines.’” Id. at 101 (quoting Brief for 
the United States at 16, Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (No. 06-6330)). But the Court did not adopt that 
concession. Id. at 108–09. 
 98. Id. at 109. 
 99. Id. at 109–10 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(McConnell, J., concurring), vacated, 552 U.S. 1306 (2008)). 
 100. Id. at 109 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007)). 
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of its characteristic institutional role”101—“closer review may be in order” when 
a district court bases its decision to impose a non-Guidelines sentence on a 
policy disagreement.102 
The Court reiterated the possibility of “closer review” in a subsequent 
crack-cocaine case, Spears v. United States.103 The Court once again repeated the 
suggestion that policy disagreements are permitted for some Guidelines, but 
not for others, in Pepper v. United States.104 The Pepper Court stated that “a 
district court may in appropriate cases impose a non-Guidelines sentence based 
on a disagreement with the Commission’s views. That is particularly true where, 
as here, the Commission’s views rest on wholly unconvincing policy rationales 
not reflected in the sentencing statutes Congress enacted.”105 Endorsing district 
court policy disagreement only in “appropriate” cases suggests that there are 
cases in which district courts do not have the power to sentence outside the 
Guidelines range on pure policy grounds. 
This reading of Pepper as endorsing only limited district court authority to 
sentence outside of the Guidelines for nonfactual reasons was confirmed in 
Peugh v. United States.106 Although Peugh did not involve a question of policy 
disagreement, the opinion explicitly noted that whether a district court’s 
decision to sentence outside Guidelines ranges based solely on policy 
considerations is subject to heightened appellate review remains an open 
question.107 
The Court has yet to explain what “closer review” might entail. District 
court sentencing decisions are presently reviewed for “reasonableness,” which 
the Court tells us is equivalent to abuse of discretion review.108 “Closer review” 
might mean that appellate courts need not accord any deference to the district 
court’s sentencing decision, leaving them free to reverse whenever they would 
have imposed a different sentence. But whatever “closer review” might mean, 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 555 U.S. 261 (2009) (per curium); id. at 264 (stating that a district court’s “‘inside the 
heartland’ departure (which is necessarily based on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines and 
necessarily disagrees on a ‘categorical basis’) may be entitled to less respect”). 
 104. 562 U.S. 476 (2011). 
 105. Id. at 501 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109–10). At issue 
in Pepper was whether a district court could impose a below-Guidelines sentence on a defendant based 
on post-sentencing rehabilitation, even though a federal statute and a Commission policy statement 
said that such evidence could not be considered at sentencing. Id. at 493, 500–01. The Pepper Court 
held the federal statute unconstitutional, and it criticized the Commission policy statement. Id. at 497–
98, 501–02. 
 106. 569 U.S. 530 (2013). 
 107. Id. at 537 n.2. 
 108. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 91, at 11 (noting that the Supreme Court did not “equate 
reasonableness review with the ‘familiar’ abuse of discretion standard” until after Booker). 
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it is a clear signal to district courts that they are more likely to be reversed on 
appeal. 
Telling a district court that it is more likely to be reversed on appeal is not 
very far removed from telling them that they are not permitted to do 
something. A rule is still a rule even when it is enforced only through appellate 
review rather than directly on district courts. Nor is it clear how one could 
reconcile the idea of close appellate review with broad sentencing discretion. 
After all, appellate review is, by its nature, a limit on district court discretion.109 
It may be necessary to dig deeper into what a “policy disagreement” means 
to understand why it is so troubling that the Court has refused to say that 
district courts may impose sentences based solely on policy disagreements with 
the Guidelines. A so-called policy disagreement with the Guidelines occurs 
when a judge imposes a non-Guidelines sentence, not because some fact or 
circumstance made a Guidelines sentence unsuitable in a particular case, but 
rather because the sentencing judge concluded that the sentence recommended 
by the Guidelines is unsuitable in many or most cases.110 
Some examples may be helpful. If a judge decides to impose a lower 
sentence because the defendant turned himself in to authorities and 
immediately compensated the victim, then the judge has deviated from the 
Guidelines based on facts and circumstances in the particular case. If a judge 
decides to impose a lower sentence on an insider trading defendant because she 
believes that the Commission generally set the sentences for white-collar 
offenses too high, then the judge has deviated from the Guidelines based on a 
policy disagreement. The same is true if the judge decides to impose a higher 
sentence because she believes that the Commission generally set the sentences 
for white-collar offenses too low. What makes a disagreement a policy 
disagreement is that the judge is imposing a non-Guidelines sentence based on 
a generalizable disagreement with the Commission rather than the specific facts 
presented in a particular case. 
The power to impose sentences based on policy disagreements with the 
Guidelines seems like it is logically required by the Booker remedy. Recall, the 
constitutional flaw in the mandatory federal sentencing regime prior to Booker 
was that sentencing judges were permitted to impose certain sentences only 
when they had made a factual finding.111 If judges do not have the ability to 
 
 109. See id. at 29. 
 110. Cf. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 267 (2009) (per curiam) (confirming that district 
courts may reject and categorically vary from the crack-cocaine range suggested by the Guidelines even 
in a “mine-run case where there are no ‘particular circumstances’ that would otherwise justify a variance 
from the Guidelines’ sentencing range”). 
 111. At the time Booker was decided, the relevant limit on sentencing authority was whether the 
judge could not impose a higher sentence without a factual finding. The Court has since decided that 
factual findings which prohibit a judge from imposing a lower sentence also raise Sixth Amendment 
problems. See supra text accompanying notes 53–72. 
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impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on a policy disagreement, then they 
must impose a Guidelines sentence unless they identify specific facts that 
render a Guidelines sentence inappropriate. Indeed, the Court seems to have 
admitted as much when it stated in Peugh that “‘a district court’s decision to 
vary from the advisory Guidelines may attract greatest respect when’ it is based 
on the particular facts of a case.”112 But if policy disagreements are not allowed, 
then the fatal constitutional flaw is reintroduced to the post-Booker sentencing 
system. 
Of course, allowing judges to sentence outside of the Guidelines range 
based only on the facts and circumstances of a particular case does not return us 
to the pre-Booker system. Prior to Booker, the only facts and circumstances that 
mattered were those identified by the Guidelines.113 But Blakely and 
Cunningham tell us that turning more facts and circumstances into permissible 
sentencing factors is not enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.114 Even if the 
sentencing court were not limited to those facts and factors specifically listed in 
the Guidelines, the judge would have to identify some fact about the defendant’s 
crime or personal background that warranted a non-Guidelines sentence.115 It 
was the requirement of some factual finding—even when judges had the 
authority to decide which facts would matter—that led the Supreme Court to 
conclude that the Washington and California sentencing systems were 
unconstitutional. So, if the Supreme Court were to conclude that federal judges 
do not have the authority to base their sentences on policy disagreements, such 
a conclusion would overrule Blakely and Cunningham. 
To be clear, the Supreme Court has not affirmatively said that district 
courts lack the authority to impose a sentence based on a policy disagreement 
with the Guidelines. Instead, it has framed the issue as an open question.116 But 
given the Court’s rulings in Blakely and Cunningham, the question should be 
considered entirely settled. And so one might suspect that the Court has 
repeatedly said that this is an open question because it is trying to minimize the 
number of judges who are willing to ignore the Guidelines on purely policy 
grounds by warning them that they might get reversed on appeal. This 
suspicion becomes more plausible when we read the Court’s ruminations about 
“closer review” for policy disagreement in the context of other statements that 
the Court has made about federal sentencing in the wake of Booker. In particular, 
 
 112. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 537 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007)). 
 113. To be clear, judges could consider facts and circumstances that were not identified in the 
Guidelines when selecting a sentence from within the narrow range identified by the Guidelines. But 
those facts and circumstances were irrelevant to the selection of the narrow Guidelines range itself. 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 53–59, 65–70. 
 115. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1668–69 
(2012). 
 116. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 537 n.2. 
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the Court has said that it expects district court judges to impose Guidelines 
sentences in most cases.117 
The Court also admits that its remedial cases were designed with the 
intent of ensuring more Guidelines sentences. For example, in Peugh, the Court 
said that “the federal sentencing regime after Booker” uses “procedural rules and 
standards for appellate review” in order to “encourage[] district courts to 
sentence within the guidelines.”118 It also stated that “the post-Booker sentencing 
regime puts in place procedural ‘hurdle[s]’ that, in practice, make the imposition 
of a non-Guidelines sentence less likely.”119 
Although the Court has, on multiple occasions, said that district court 
judges may not presume that a Guidelines sentence is appropriate,120 it has also 
said that district judges may rely on “the Guidelines range to instruct them 
regarding the appropriate balance of the relevant federal sentencing factors.”121 
Personally, I do not understand how using the Guidelines range to “instruct” 
oneself of the proper sentence is even remotely different than presuming that 
the sentencing range is reasonable. And the Court never bothers to clarify. 
These statements strongly suggest that the Court expects district courts to 
impose non-Guidelines sentences only in unusual cases—that is, in cases where 
the facts and circumstances warrant a different sentence. Since the Court 
readily admits that it has consciously used “procedural rules and standards for 
appellate review” to create more within-Guidelines sentences,122 it is hard not 
to suspect that they have left this question open on purpose and for the same 
reason. 
 
 117. Id. at 542 (“Normally, a ‘judge will use the Guidelines range as the starting point in the 
analysis and impose a sentence within the range.’” (quoting Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 
529 (2011) (plurality opinion))). 
 118. Id. at 547. 
 119. Id. at 542 (quoting Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435 (1987), abrogated by Peugh, 569 U.S. 
530). 
 120. Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (per curiam) (“Our cases do not allow a 
sentencing court to presume that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range is reasonable.”); 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (stating that the district court judge “may not presume 
that the Guidelines range is reasonable”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (“[T]he 
sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should 
apply.”). 
 121. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1347 (2016). Similarly, the Rita Court 
said: “Circumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission’s own 
reasoning.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 357. We know very little about the Commission’s reasoning, and it is clear 
that the Commission simply relied on distorted calculations of past sentencing practice to set the 
sentencing ranges of many guidelines. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 60–61 (describing and 
criticizing the origins of many guidelines); Hessick, After Kimbrough, supra note 91, at 726–33 
(analyzing Kimbrough’s failure to accurately describe the development of the Guidelines). Because of 
this, it is unclear to me how a district court could know—let alone rely—on the Commission’s reasoning 
about how to best balance the § 3553(a) factors. 
 122. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 547. 
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B. Appellate Review 
As noted above, the Booker remedy sought to ensure sentencing uniformity 
by preserving appellate review of sentences.123 Before Booker, appellate review 
was designed to ensure that district judges correctly calculated the Guidelines 
range and sentenced within that range. The SRA empowered the appellate 
courts to overturn any sentence that “was imposed in violation of law or 
imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.”124 
It further granted the power to overturn any sentence that was “outside the 
range of the applicable sentencing guideline range” and was “unreasonable.”125 
The SRA was later amended to clarify that “the court of appeals shall review de 
novo the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts” for any 
sentence.126 
Booker rejected this de novo standard of review. It held that sentencing 
decisions would be reviewed only for “reasonableness.”127 According to the 
remedial majority, appellate review would recover some sentencing uniformity 
by allowing the circuit courts “to iron out sentencing differences” in the district 
courts.128 But the Booker remedial opinion was vague about how courts of 
appeals would conduct reasonableness review. The dissenters expressed doubt 
that the remedial majority had given appellate courts sufficient guidance about 
how to conduct reasonableness review,129 and the remedial majority’s claim that 
that reasonableness review was “already familiar to appellate courts”130 was not 
supported by the evidence that it cited.131 
In the cases that followed Booker, the Court elaborated on what it meant 
by reasonableness review. In so doing, the Court developed an appellate 
doctrine that not only deviated from ordinary appellate principles132 but also re-
entrenched the Guidelines. Those subsequent cases made clear that appellate 
review is not about simply recapturing some semblance of uniformity. It is 
 
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 83–90, 118–19. 
 124. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 213(e)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2012 (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 670 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2004), invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). The amended 
statute also directed appellate courts to determine whether a district court’s departure “is not justified 
by the facts of the case.” Id. § 401(d)(1). 
 127. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260–64 (2005) (remedial majority). 
 128. Id. at 263–64. 
 129. Id. at 311 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); see also id. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 130. Id. at 261 (remedial majority). 
 131. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 91, at 9–10 (describing how reasonableness was not the 
appellate standard used in many of the cases the remedial majority claimed it was and further 
demonstrating that the reasonableness standard was not consistently applied when it was employed). 
 132. Id. at 18–28. 
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about encouraging trial courts to follow the Guidelines and discouraging them 
from making their own independent sentencing decisions. 
The Court’s first attempt to clarify appellate review came only a year after 
Booker. In Rita v. United States,133 the Supreme Court said that appellate courts 
may “presume” that sentences that follow the Guidelines are reasonable. In 
other words, appellate courts are free to conduct a less searching review of 
sentences that fall within the Guidelines’ advisory range. 
A year after Rita, in Gall v. United States,134 the Court declared that 
“reasonableness review” has two stages.135 First, appellate courts determine 
whether a sentence is procedurally reasonable. According to Gall, a judge 
commits a procedural error if she fails to calculate (or improperly calculates) 
the Guidelines range, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence 
based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately explain the chosen 
sentence. Assuming that the judge properly calculated the Guidelines range, the 
appellate court must then determine whether the sentence imposed was 
substantively reasonable. Gall instructed the courts of appeals to “take into 
account the totality of the circumstances,”136 and it also suggested that this 
review should be conducted no differently for sentences inside the Guidelines 
range than those outside of the range.137 But this even-handed language was 
undercut elsewhere in the opinion. For example, in stating that appellate courts 
should consider the totality of the circumstances, the Gall Court mentioned 
only a single circumstance—“the extent of any variance from the Guidelines 
range.”138 It also said it is “uncontroversial that a major departure should be 
supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.”139 
More recent cases confirm that the Guidelines are intended to play a 
substantial role in appellate review. In Peugh for example, the Court appeared 
to admonish appellate courts to conduct this substantive review of sentencing 
using the Guidelines range as a “meaningful benchmark.”140 Indeed, the 
Guidelines are the only substantive criteria that the Court has identified for 
appellate review of sentences post-Booker.141 
 
 133. 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
 134. 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 135. Id. at 51. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 49 (“[T]he abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to appellate review of all 
sentencing decisions—whether inside or outside the Guidelines range.”). 
 138. Id. at 51. 
 139. Id. at 50. 
 140. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541 (2013). 
 141. See id. at 542 (speaking of appellate review in terms of the Guidelines, for example, “appellate 
review for reasonableness using the Guidelines as a benchmark helps promote uniformity,” and 
“[c]ourts of appeals may presume a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable, and they may further 
‘consider the extent of the deviation’ from the Guidelines as part of their reasonableness review” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)). 
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Perhaps most importantly, the Court has admitted that it uses “standards 
for appellate review” in order to “encourage[] district courts to sentence within 
the guidelines.”142 And it seems to have worked. In both Peugh and Molina-
Martinez v. United States,143 the Court spoke in positive terms about how many 
Guidelines sentences are imposed, leading the Court to conclude that there is 
“considerable empirical evidence indicating that the Sentencing Guidelines 
have the intended effect of influencing the sentences imposed by judges.”144 
But pushing judges to impose sentences that are either within the 
Guidelines—or very close to it—seems inconsistent with the logic of Booker. 
The Booker Court leaned heavily on the idea of what is legally permitted or 
legally authorized in developing the “advisory” Guidelines remedy. The 
remedial majority said judicial fact-finding for advisory Guidelines did not 
violate the Sixth Amendment because judges now had discretion to sentence 
above the Guidelines range without making any factual findings.145 This 
discretion meant the advisory Guidelines range did not define the maximum 
punishment—the statute did.146 
This argument—that district courts are authorized to sentence anywhere 
within the statutory sentencing range despite having to calculate the Guidelines 
range—might be persuasive if that were an accurate description of appellate 
review in the post-Booker system. But it is not. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly treated the Guidelines differently for appellate review—reducing 
the scrutiny of within-Guidelines sentences and requiring no explanation for 
them, while at the same time requiring explanations for non-Guidelines 
sentences and telling appellate courts to rely on the extent to which a sentence 
deviates from the Guidelines in deciding whether the sentence is 
unreasonable.147 
These developments suggest that the Court has calibrated appellate review 
of federal sentences to serve as an end run around its Sixth Amendment right. 
It has insisted that the post-Booker system complies with the Sixth Amendment 
because district court judges have the discretion to sentence outside of the 
Guidelines range. At the same time, it has permitted—if not encouraged—
appellate courts to curtail that discretion and funnel cases back within the 
Guidelines range through their review practices. It is hard to understand why 
such a system complies with the Sixth Amendment—if it violates the 
Constitution to directly constrain sentencing authority through mandatory 
 
 142. Id. at 547. 
 143. 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016). 
 144. Id. at 1346; Peugh, 569 U.S. at 543. 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88. 
 146. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 147. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
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guidelines, it should equally violate the Constitution to constrain that discretion 
indirectly through reversal on appeal. 
Perhaps in recognition of this fact, the Court sometimes frames its 
Guidelines-centric appellate review as something that circuit courts are 
permitted, but not required, to adopt. The most obvious example of this 
permissive approach is Rita’s “presumption of reasonableness.”148 After granting 
certiorari to resolve a circuit split over whether such a presumption was 
permitted, the Court declined to resolve the split, saying that those circuits that 
want to apply a presumption can, and those that do not want to need not.149 The 
Gall Court also suggested that Guidelines-centric appellate review was 
permissive, rather than mandatory, in stating that appellate courts “may 
consider the extent of the deviation” when assessing whether a non-Guidelines 
sentence was unreasonable.150 In more recent cases, the Court has suggested that 
Guidelines-centric review is an intended, rather than merely permissive, feature 
of appellate sentencing review.151 
Appellate courts appear to have taken the Supreme Court at its word, and 
they have developed different appellate review standards.152 The Court is well 
aware of those different legal standards, and it has opted not to review them 
and provide uniform appellate standards for the country.153 It is difficult to 
understand why the Court has allowed different appellate legal standards to 
persist across the country—especially in light of the fact that it retained 
appellate review after Booker in order to promote uniformity. The most likely 
answer appears to be that the Court is willing to sacrifice uniformity of law—
giving up its ordinary role of resolving different legal rules in the circuits154—
 
 148. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–49 (2007). 
 149. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 91, at 21 (noting that the Rita Court “made the presumption 
optional, stating that circuit courts ‘may’ choose to rely on the presumption and that the presumption 
is ‘non-binding’”). 
 150. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
 151. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541 (2013) (noting that the Court “aims to achieve 
uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines and that they remain 
a meaningful benchmark through the process of appellate review”). 
 152. See Hessick, After Kimbrough, supra note 91, at 733–41 (collecting examples of different legal 
standards in the courts of appeals); Anne Louise Marshall, How Do Federal Courts of Appeals Apply 
Booker Reasonableness Review After Gall?, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1419, 1435–36 (2008) (same). 
 153. For example, the Court recently denied certiorari in a case that squarely presented two 
appellate review circuit splits—the policy disagreement question and a question about how deferential 
courts of appeals must be to non-Guidelines sentencing decisions. United States v. Demma, 948 F.3d 
722, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 620 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 154. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 91, at 21 n.106 (noting how odd it is that the 
Supreme Court refused to actually resolve the legal question in Rita and instead left appellate 
courts free to adopt the presumption of reasonableness or not because “[c]ertiorari is usually granted 
to resolve differences in the circuits; but Rita appears to endorse differing treatment in different 
circuits” (quoting Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Rita: More for District Courts?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 2007, 12:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/rita-more-
for-district-courts [https://perma.cc/6UZW-F645]). 
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in order to encourage more within-Guidelines sentences. These different legal 
standards have had noticeable effects on district court behavior. In the Fifth 
Circuit, which has adopted appellate review standards that push sentences 
towards the Guidelines,155 84.3% of sentences were imposed consistent with the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.156 In the Second Circuit, which has adopted 
appellate review standards that afford district courts more latitude,157 only 55.3% 
of sentences comply with the Guidelines.158 
Regardless whether the Court is requiring or merely encouraging 
Guidelines-centric appellate review, such review means that a district court does 
not have authority or discretion to sentence within the full statutory sentencing 
range in all cases. If appellate courts are going to reverse them if they deviate 
too much from the Guidelines, then district court judges do not have the 
authority that they have been promised. If a government official is told that 
another government actor will overrule their decision, does the first official 
actually have the authority to take that action? That may be a somewhat 
philosophical way to frame the question, but I still think that the answer is “no.” 
If, for example, a prosecutor indicts a suspect without probable cause and a court 
later dismisses the indictment, we would not say that the prosecutor had the 
authority to indict without probable cause. To the contrary, we would say that 
the indictment must be dismissed because the prosecutor was not authorized to 
indict in the absence of probable cause. 
To be sure, the post-Booker appellate review system has extended the 
upper and lower limits of the Guidelines’ sentencing ranges. The Supreme 
Court interprets the Commission’s data to mean that Guidelines ranges 
continue to exert gravitational pull even on those sentences that are not 
precisely within their range—as the range changes up or down, so do 
sentences.159 But it has not restored the authority of judges to impose any 
sentence within the full statutory sentencing range. Appellate courts are 
 
 155. See Hessick, After Kimbrough, supra note 91, at 737–40. 
 156. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET: FISCAL YEAR 2018: FIFTH 
CIRCUIT 12 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-
sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2018/5c18.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L35-JDCX]. This figure 
includes “offenders whose sentences are determined to be either within the guideline range or outside 
the guideline range and for which the court cited a reason on Part V of the Statement of Reasons 
form (Departures Pursuant to the Guidelines Manual).” U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL 
REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 210 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 
ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/2018-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2E5P-2BKZ]. 
 157. See Hessick, After Kimbrough, supra note 91, at 733–34. 
 158. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET: FISCAL YEAR 2018: 
SECOND CIRCUIT 12 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/ 
federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2018/2c18.pdf [https://perma.cc/9856-ZTJJ]. 
 159. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 543–44 (2013); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 
S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016). 
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encouraged to reverse district judges’ sentences that are dramatically different 
than the Guidelines range, unless they have identified factual circumstances 
that uniquely warrant such a sentence. 
In Booker, the Court thought that the inability of a sentencing judge to 
impose the statutory maximum sentence in most cases triggered the Sixth 
Amendment.160 But the Court’s post-Booker cases have reintroduced that same 
problem in its federal remedy. The Guidelines range may not set the outer 
boundaries of sentencing authority in run-of-the-mill cases—appellate courts 
will permit some minor deviations—but neither do the statutory maximum and 
minimum sentences. To the extent that appellate courts will affirm a sentence 
only in extraordinary or unique cases—that is, to the extent that “a major 
departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor 
one”161—it remains a mystery why the facts that are necessary to support that 
“significant justification” need not be found by a jury. 
C. Independent Sentencing Analysis 
The Booker remedial opinion suggested that an “advisory” Guidelines 
system would look a lot like sentencing before the SRA. Not only did the Court 
rely on the history of judicial fact-finding in the aid of sentencing discretion to 
justify its remedy, but it also laid out a vision for sentencing that resembled that 
pre-SRA regime. The Booker opinion required judges to calculate the 
Guidelines’ sentencing range (which required judges to find facts that were 
identified ex ante). But the Booker remedy also required district court judges to 
do more. It replaced the mandatory Guidelines regime with a statutory 
balancing test—a test for which the Guidelines range was but one of several 
factors. District court judges were instructed that the first step at sentencing 
was to calculate the appropriate Guidelines range. But after that calculation, 
judges were instructed to choose a sentence based on a balancing of all of the 
§ 3553(a) factors.162 
Those § 3553(a) factors look an awful lot like traditional sentencing 
discretion. The factors include “the nature and the circumstances of the 
offense”163 and factors that appear to restate the major theoretical justifications 
for punishment—retributivism, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.164 These factors are written in sufficiently broad terms that they 
could support basically any sentence within the statutory range. What is more, 
they clearly require the sentencing judge to make policy judgments about 
appropriate sentences. 
 
 160. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005) (merits majority). 
 161. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). 
 162. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–60 (remedial majority). 
 163. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
 164. Id. § 3553(a)(2). 
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But the Supreme Court’s post-Booker jurisprudence appears to have 
abandoned any notion that judges must engage in this independent sentencing 
analysis. The Court continues to say that district court judges may be reversed 
for failing to calculate the Guidelines, calculating them incorrectly, or failing to 
justify a decision to sentence outside of the Guidelines.165 But it requires trial 
judges to do absolutely nothing to incorporate any of the § 3553(a) factors other 
than the Guidelines. 
On more than one occasion, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
district court judges need not say anything about their sentencing decision other 
than calculating the proper Guidelines range. Even when a defendant makes a 
detailed argument about why the Guidelines would be too harsh in his case, the 
Court will not require the judge to explain why those arguments do not affect 
her § 3553(a) analysis. 
That is precisely what happened in Rita. The district court failed to 
address any of the defendant’s arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence. Nor 
did it provide any indication of how it balanced the § 3553(a) factors. All one 
could glean from the district court’s “statement of reasons” for the sentence it 
imposed was that the judge decided to impose a Guidelines sentence.166 The 
Supreme Court affirmed the sentence despite the fact that there was nothing in 
the record to suggest that the judge had actually performed the independent 
§ 3553(a) analysis required by Booker or why the judge did not accept the 
defendant’s arguments in favor of a below-Guidelines sentence.167 
To be sure, Rita did not say that trial courts could treat the Guidelines as 
mandatory. Although it affirmed the authority of courts of appeals to employ a 
presumption of reasonableness, the Court took pains to point out that the 
presumption was only an appellate presumption.168 District courts were not 
permitted to presume that the Guidelines range was reasonable. And the Court 
reversed a sentence in a subsequent case when the district court stated on the 
record that it was presuming that the Guidelines range was reasonable.169 But 
 
 165. See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
 166. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 345 (2007). 
 167. Id. at 358–59. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in which he expressed concern about 
the lack of independent analysis in the district court’s statement of reasons. Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). But he nonetheless voted to affirm the sentence in order to respect the discretion of the 
district court judge since that discretion includes the discretion to impose a sentence within the 
Guidelines. Id. 
 168. Id. at 351 (majority opinion). 
 169. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 350 (2009) (per curium). But at the same time that 
the Rita Court advised district court judges that they may not presume that Guidelines ranges are 
reasonable, it also insisted that the Commission, which writes the Guidelines, has institutional 
advantages over the district courts when it comes to balancing the § 3553(a) factors to arrive at a 
sentencing range. Rita, 551 U.S. at 347–49. If district courts are not supposed to presume that the 
Commission’s Guidelines ranges are reasonable, one wonders why the Court insisted on explaining 
why the Commission is better situated to balance the § 3553(a) factors in typical cases. 
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in affirming a sentence without any indication that an independent analysis 
actually occurred, the Court signaled to district courts that appellate review 
functions only to ensure that they calculate the Guidelines range and justify any 
sentence outside of that range; it will not ensure that they undertake any 
independent analysis when they sentence within the Guidelines. 
If Rita signaled the first move away from Booker’s independent analysis 
requirement, subsequent cases have dealt it a fatal blow. In Molina-Martinez, 
for example, the Supreme Court reviewed another within-Guidelines sentence 
where the district court provided no explanation for the sentence.170 But while 
the Rita Court was willing to assume that the district court judge had engaged 
in an independent § 3553(a) analysis even though he had not explained the 
sentence, the Molina-Martinez Court assumed that the judge had not engaged 
in an independent § 3553(a) analysis. What is more, the Molina-Martinez Court 
raised no objection to the failure to conduct that analysis.171 
Molina-Martinez involved a question of harmless error—namely whether 
a defendant was entitled to remand when the trial court had miscalculated the 
Guidelines range. Some appellate courts held that, because district courts were 
free to sentence anywhere in the statutory range after Booker, a Guidelines 
miscalculation alone was not enough to show “a reasonable probability” that the 
defendant would have received a different sentence if the calculation had been 
correct.172 It seems entirely unremarkable to say that there is a “reasonable 
probability” that defendants would have received a different sentence if there 
was a calculation error. Misinformation at sentencing has long been deemed a 
reason to reverse an otherwise lawful sentence.173 
Rather than simply relying on that precedent, the Court spoke about the 
post-Booker role of the Guidelines in a manner that was troubling. The Molina-
Martinez Court noted that the district court “said nothing specific about why it 
chose the sentence it imposed” but instead “merely adopted the guideline 
applications in the presentence investigation report.”174 The Supreme Court 
seemed to think that this was precisely what the Booker remedy was designed to 
accomplish: “As intended, the Guidelines served as the starting point for the 
 
 170. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1344–45 (2016). 
 171. Id. at 1346–47 (“The record in a case may show, for example, that the district court thought 
the sentence it chose was appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range. Judges may find that some 
cases merit a detailed explanation of the reasons the selected sentence is appropriate. And that 
explanation could make it clear that the judge based the sentence he or she selected on factors 
independent of the Guidelines.”). 
 172. Id. at 1341–42. 
 173. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); United States v. Gonzalez-Castillo, 562 
F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that defendants “have a due process right to be sentenced upon 
information which is not false or materially incorrect” (quoting United States v. Pellerito, 918 F.2d 
999, 1002 (1st Cir. 1990))); see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447–48 (1972) (reaffirming 
Townsend). 
 174. Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1347. 
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sentencing and were the focal point for the proceedings that followed.”175 The 
idea that a judge merely imposing a Guidelines sentence without any 
explanation is the “intended” outcome of a federal sentencing is disturbing. The 
Booker remedy should not intend to have trial courts impose Guidelines 
sentences; it should intend to have trial courts seriously consider not only the 
Guidelines but also other information before arriving at an independent 
sentencing decision. 
The Molina-Martinez Court not only suggested that district court judges 
have no obligation to explain their independent sentencing analysis, it also 
suggested that they have no obligation to engage in that analysis themselves: 
“District courts, as a matter of course, use the Guidelines range to instruct them 
regarding the appropriate balance of the relevant federal sentencing factors.”176 
In other words, the Court believed that many (if not most) trial courts select 
the Guidelines range only because the Commission believed that was an 
appropriate sentence. Remarkably, when stating that only some judges believe 
that the sentences they choose are appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines 
range and that only some judges base the sentences they select on factors 
independent of the Guidelines, the Molina-Martinez Court did not indicate that 
the judges who are not engaging in an independent § 3553(a) analysis are 
violating the Booker remedy. Nor did it explain how these practices are 
consistent with the Court’s prior admonitions that district court judges may not 
presume that the Guidelines range is a reasonable sentence.177 These two failures 
suggest that the Court cares only about the proper application of the 
Guidelines; it does not care that judges are failing to conduct an independent 
analysis of their sentencing decisions under § 3553(a).178 
In short, the Molina-Martinez Court assumed that the defendant in that 
case, as well as many others, was sentenced only on the basis of the Guidelines 
calculation and not on the basis of an independent § 3553(a) analysis. And yet 
the Court indicated that sentences that are based only on a Guidelines 
calculation are problematic only if there was an error in that calculation. This 
strongly suggests that the Court is no longer committed to ensuring that post-
Booker sentencing includes an independent analysis of the appropriate sentence 
using the § 3553(a) factors and that its previous admonitions to district courts 
about not presuming that Guidelines sentences are reasonable were about style 
rather than substance. Without the independent-analysis requirement, the 
Booker remedy does nothing more than ensure judges have discretion to sentence 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See supra note 120 (collecting cases). 
 178. See, e.g., Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1342, 1345 (describing “the Guidelines’ central role in 
sentencing” and mentioning only the Guidelines as something that the judge “must consult” when 
imposing a sentence). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1195 (2021) 
2021] THE SIXTH AMENDMENT SENTENCING RIGHT 1225 
outside the Guidelines, not that they use that discretion. And, as the previous 
sections explained, the Supreme Court has also used its post-Booker cases to cut 
back on that discretion. 
III.  SENTENCING, HISTORY, AND PRINCIPLES 
From its inception, the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine has been 
grounded in history. The Justices who initially recognized the right relied on 
the importance of the jury during the Founding era to conclude that modern 
sentencing practices violated the constitutional right to a jury trial. The 
decisions in Apprendi, Blakely, and Alleyne are replete with references to opinions 
of the Founding Fathers, old treatises, and pre-twentieth-century cases. 
Although none of those sources specifically prohibit the modern sentencing 
practices, the Justices emphasize how Founding-era sentencing practices are 
different than modern practices. Those differences and the tendency of modern 
practices to undermine the importance of the jury as an institution led the Court 
to conclude that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the modern practices. 
The Justices who fashioned the “advisory guidelines” remedy in Booker 
also relied on history. Before legislatures began to create their structured 
sentencing systems, there was a long tradition of allowing judges to select 
sentences from within broad statutory ranges, and there was agreement that 
judges could make whatever factual findings they wanted in order to exercise 
that discretion.179 Relying on statements from the merits majority and previous 
Sixth Amendment cases affirming the constitutionality of judicial sentencing 
discretion, the Booker remedial majority insisted that, so long as judges had 
sentencing discretion, any factual findings they made to aid their exercise of 
that discretion was constitutional.180 
But in subsequently “clarifying” the Booker remedy, the Supreme Court 
has endorsed a system that bears a much greater resemblance to the mandatory 
sentencing systems it struck down in Blakely and Cunningham than the 
discretionary sentencing systems that existed prior to the rise of structured 
 
 179. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116 (2013) (“[B]road sentencing discretion, informed 
by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 
270, 285 (2007) (“We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in 
imposing a sentence within a statutory range.” (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 
(2005))); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“[W]hen a trial judge exercises his 
discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury 
determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 
(2000) (“We should be clear that nothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to 
exercise discretion—taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender—in 
imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We have often noted that judges in this 
country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the 
individual case.”). 
 180. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259. 
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sentencing. Indeed, many federal defendants receive no more protection from 
the Sixth Amendment at sentencing than did the people who were sentenced 
under the mandatory system that the Court purported to strike down in Booker. 
The post-Booker cases seem to assume the constitutionality of the Booker 
remedy so long as it is not entirely identical to any of the systems that have 
been declared unconstitutional.181 But if we use history not only as an 
authorization of the advisory guidelines system but also as a benchmark against 
which to assess that system, then it becomes clear that the advisory system—at 
least as it is currently formulated—cannot be justified by historical practice. In 
particular, the unwillingness to recognize district court authority to sentence 
based on policy disagreement with the Guidelines, the Guidelines-centric 
nature of appellate review, and the failure to ensure district courts are exercising 
independent sentencing judgment are all highly inconsistent with historical 
sentencing practice. 
Not only have the Justices failed to use history as a limit on their 
“subsequent calibration” of the Booker remedy,182 but they have also failed to 
ensure that the remedy actually protects the interests that the Sixth 
Amendment serves—namely the liberty interests of criminal defendants and 
the value of democratic input in individual criminal cases. Restoring some 
limited judicial discretion does not obviously further either of the principles 
behind the jury-trial right. It does not make it more difficult to punish 
defendants nor does it ensure democratic input into the decision. And to the 
extent that the Court has “recalibrated” the Booker remedy, it has done so in a 
way that exacerbates these problems. 
A. History as a Justification and a Limit 
The early American history of criminal punishment is difficult to study.183 
As a general matter, criminal practices often are not enshrined in published 
opinions, and so those who wish to study the history of criminal punishment 
must either rely on secondary accounts or look for original sources. The search 
for original sources is complicated by the fact that the federal government had 
very few criminal prosecutions, so one must look to the states. But state 
practices were not uniform, historical state records can be difficult to locate, and 
the effort required to collect and analyze documents from all of the states can 
be time-consuming and difficult. 
 
 181. In Peugh, the Court stated that the Booker remedy has been “subsequently calibrated” in a 
manner “intended to promote sentencing uniformity while avoiding a Sixth Amendment violation.” 
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 550 (2013). 
 182. Id. at 549. 
 183. See Hessick & Berry, supra note 7, at 469 n.100 (discussing the difficulty of locating reliable 
historical sources that describe sentencing practices). 
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Even if the history surrounding early American sentencing practices were 
easy to discover, modern sentencing cases present another difficulty. Many of 
the modern sentencing practices that the Court must evaluate do not appear to 
have existed in the Founding era. Because those practices did not exist, history 
cannot definitively tell us whether the original understanding of the Sixth 
Amendment would have permitted or prohibited the practice. Instead, the 
Justices have to make their own decisions about what to permit and what to 
prohibit, though they often do so while claiming the mantle of originalism. 
One prominent example of this difficulty is the Court’s decision in Oregon 
v. Ice.184 Ice involved a state statute that regulated the imposition of consecutive 
sentences for those defendants who were convicted of multiple crimes. The 
Oregon statute required a judge to find one or more statutorily identified facts 
in order to impose consecutive sentences.185 If the judge did not find such a fact, 
then the defendant was entitled to serve the sentences for those different crimes 
concurrently (that is, at the same time). 
Neither the majority nor the dissent identified any early American 
practice that conditioned the imposition of consecutive sentences on judicial 
fact-finding. And both agreed that states had historically left the question 
whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences to the judge, who could 
decide the issues as a matter of her discretion.186 The majority interpreted this 
common-law practice of judicial discretion as evidence that the Oregon statute 
did not implicate the Sixth Amendment.187 But the dissenters interpreted it as 
the opposite—that to the extent judges could make the decisions, their authority 
to do so could not be conditioned on mandatory fact-finding.188 
Advisory guidelines pose the same methodological problem that occurred 
in Ice. No advisory guidelines existed at the time that the Constitution was 
written, and so we cannot know for sure whether the Founders would have 
believed that such a sentencing system violated the Sixth Amendment.189 While 
the lack of historical analogue was seen as a reason not to deem a practice 
unconstitutional in Ice, the Justices who formed the majority in Jones and 
Apprendi took the opposite approach. They acknowledged that “the scholarship 
of which we are aware does not show that a question exactly like this one was 
 
 184. 555 U.S. 160 (2009). 
 185. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.123 (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. of 
the 80th Legis. Assemb.). 
 186. Ice, 555 U.S. at 168–69; id. at 174–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 168–70 (majority opinion). 
 188. Id. at 175–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 189. This problem of how to assess the constitutionality of a practice that did not exist at the 
Founding is hardly limited to sentencing. It is a methodological challenge for originalism more 
generally. As an example of how this is a methodological challenge for originalism, see the dueling 
opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 
358–71 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), and id. at 371–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ever raised and resolved in the period before the framing,”190 but ultimately 
concluded that the fact that “[a]ny possible distinction between an ‘element’ of 
a felony offense and a ‘sentencing factor’ was unknown to the practice of 
criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed during 
the years surrounding our Nation’s founding” was a reason to deem those 
modern practices unconstitutional.191 
Even though we do not have clear evidence that the original understanding 
of the Sixth Amendment would have forbidden advisory sentencing 
guidelines—that is, even though we do not have an authoritative Founding era 
court opinion in which judges said such practices are unconstitutional—there 
are still strong reasons to view the current Booker remedy with constitutional 
suspicion. In particular, the three features of the remedy described in Part II—
the unwillingness to recognize district court authority to sentence based on 
policy disagreement with the Guidelines, the Guidelines-centric nature of 
appellate review, and the failure to ensure district courts are exercising 
independent sentencing judgment—look incredibly different than the historical 
sentencing practices that supposedly justify them. And, as described more fully 
in the next section, an advisory guidelines regime fails to protect the principles 
underlying the Sixth Amendment.192 
Let us first examine the Court’s unwillingness to state that district court 
judges may sentence outside of the Guidelines based only on policy 
disagreement.193 This unwillingness is impossible to square with the historical 
practice that the Court relied on to fashion the Booker remedy. Specifically, the 
Booker remedy relied on our history of broad judicial sentencing discretion. As 
the Booker Court said, “when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a 
specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury 
determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”194 Judges enjoyed that 
discretion because sentencing was thought to be a circumstance-driven and 
defendant-specific endeavor. Judicial fact-finding at sentencing was not limited 
to specific sentencing factors because it was widely believed that those facts that 
ought to increase or decrease sentences could not be identified ex ante.195 
Next, let us consider the Court’s appellate review doctrine after Booker.196 
It fares even worse when compared to historical practice. Before the SRA was 
passed, appellate review of federal criminal sentences was nonexistent in most 
 
 190. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 244 (1999). 
 191. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000) (emphasizing that, as a general rule, there 
should be no doubt as to what judgment should be given if a defendant is convicted). 
 192. See infra Section III.B. 
 193. See supra Section II.A. 
 194. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005). 
 195. See Hessick & Berry, supra note 7, at 474–75. 
 196. See supra Section II.B. 
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cases.197 So long as a sentence was within the range authorized by statutes, 
appellate courts would refuse to hear any appeal from a judge’s sentencing 
decision. This refusal was based on a federal statute passed in 1891, which was 
generally understood to have stripped appellate courts of jurisdiction to hear 
appeals from federal criminal sentences.198 Before that statute was passed, 
federal appellate courts “had power to correct harsh sentences on appeal.”199 The 
states also generally declined to provide appellate review of sentences within 
the authorized statutory range. A mid-twentieth-century review of the matter 
found fewer than a dozen states that authorized appeals from sentencing 
decisions.200 Those states which permitted appellate review of sentencing did so 
under quite deferential standards. Appellate review basically served only as a 
check on excessively harsh sentences.201 
To be sure, there were exceptions to the federal appellate courts’ refusal 
to hear appeals from sentences within the statutory range. Appellate courts 
would reverse a sentence within the statutory range in cases where the 
sentencing courts based their decisions on “material misinformation [or] upon 
constitutionally impermissible considerations,” such as race.202 Such sentences 
were said to violate defendants’ constitutional rights, regardless whether they 
were authorized by statute.203 In addition, several circuit courts held that 
 
 197. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (“Before the Guidelines system, a federal 
criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable on appeal.”); 
Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (“[T]he general proposition [is] that once it is 
determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, 
appellate review is at an end.”). 
 198. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 197–98 n.3. 
 199. Symposium, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 259 (1962) (“Prior to 1891, the old 
circuit courts had power to correct harsh sentences on appeal; and the power was exercised. But the 
language of the 1891 statute creating the new appellate courts was thought to ‘repeal’ that grant of 
authority; and since 1891 federal upper courts have generally denied themselves any power to revise 
sentences.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 200. Comment, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE 
L.J. 1453, 1453 (1960) (noting that eleven states provided some form of review of criminal sentences). 
 201. See, e.g., State v. Kunz, 259 A.2d 895, 901–03 (N.J. 1969) (noting a defendant’s right to appeal 
from a sentence that is “manifestly excessive”); Montalto v. State, 199 N.E. 198, 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1935) (stating that “the rule generally applied may be that a reviewing court will not disturb a sentence 
as excessive, provided it is within the limits prescribed by law,” but on the other hand, “if the sentence 
appears to be very much greater than the proper protection of society demands, and the record justifies 
the conclusion that the sentence was probably the result of prejudice rather than the exercise of a sound 
discretion, a reviewing court has the power to relieve against the excessiveness of the sentence”). 
 202. United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, A New 
“Sliding Scale of Deference” Approach to Abuse of Discretion: Appellate Review of District Court Departures 
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 6 n.19 (1997); Appellate Review of 
Sentences, supra note 199, at 259 (“A sentence will be vacated when a reviewing tribunal finds that it is 
based upon information which is so clearly incorrect or upon criteria so improper as to constitute a 
violation of the defendant’s right to due process.”). 
 203. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948); see also United States v. Tucker, 
404 U.S. 443, 447–49 (1972) (reaffirming Townsend). 
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sentencing judges could not impose the statutory maximum punishment based 
solely on the crime of conviction. Those courts said district court judges were 
required to individualize sentences based on the facts or circumstances of the 
defendant’s offense and personal background.204 The circuits justified their 
intervention in sentencing decisions on the theory that, when the sentencing 
court does not actually exercise its discretion when imposing a sentence, then 
“the appellate court does not usurp the discretion vested in the district court 
when it reviews the sentence.”205 
Importantly, even these modest appellate limits on district court 
sentencing authority often could not be enforced. As a practical matter, 
appellate courts were unable to review the reasons behind many sentencing 
decisions because sentencing courts were not required to explain the sentences 
that they imposed.206 When lower courts did not explain their sentences, 
appellate courts had little or no ability to determine whether the sentencing 
judges exercised their discretion in a prohibited way. 
To put a finer point on it, it is extremely difficult to understand why the 
Court believes that this Guidelines-centric appellate review satisfies the Sixth 
Amendment. The only real justification that the Court has given for the Booker 
remedy is that judicial fact-finding in aid of judicial sentencing discretion has 
historically been understood to stand outside of the Sixth Amendment. But the 
appellate review that the Court has created in its post-Booker cases looks nothing 
like the sort of appellate scrutiny that criminal sentences received in the 
discretionary sentencing systems that the Court uses as a historical analogy for 
its post-Booker advisory system. In those discretionary systems, appellate review 
was limited to a very narrow set of circumstances and it was exceedingly 
deferential.207 Outside of those narrow circumstances, what sentence to impose 
and why were questions left to the trial judge, leading to the perception that 
sentencing courts could impose sentences for any reason or no reason at all.208 
There can be no real dispute that appellate review in the post-Booker 
system does not resemble appellate review in discretionary sentencing regimes: 
 
 204. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 655 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 970–71 (6th Cir. 
1971); Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143–44 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. McCoy, 429 
F.2d 739, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 205. United States v. Bates, 852 F.2d 212, 220 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 206. O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 11, at 2–3 (noting that due process protections, including a 
statement of reasons for government action, that apply to agency action appear not to govern federal 
sentencing). 
 207. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 208. See O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 11, at 2–3 (“[T]here is no requirement that the sentence 
have any rational basis whatsoever.”); Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing 
Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 61 (2006) (“From the nineteenth through the mid-twentieth 
century, sentencing judges enjoyed almost unfettered discretion. . . . Sentencing judges were free to 
select any sentence within the range for any reason or no reason at all.”). 
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post-Booker appellate review exists to push district court judges to sentence 
within or close to the Guidelines range, rather than merely to correct excessively 
harsh sentences. If anything, post-Booker appellate review looks like a slightly 
watered-down version of the pre-Booker appellate review: district court judges 
will be reversed if they fail to make required factual findings and calculate the 
correct Guidelines range. And while appellate courts will permit minor 
variations from the Guidelines range, they will demand additional explanation 
and fact-finding before permitting sentences that are significantly different 
than the Guidelines range. Indeed, many appellate reversals are of sentences 
that appellate judges deem too lenient209—a stark contrast with historical 
appellate review, which was all about reversing sentences that were too harsh.210 
Finally, let us examine the Court’s failure to ensure that district court 
judges are engaged in any independent sentencing analysis.211 That failure is 
also entirely inconsistent with historical practice. It is only if the sentencing 
judge takes seriously her responsibility to engage in a § 3553(a) analysis that 
post-Booker sentencing resembles the broad discretionary systems that the 
Court tells us do not implicate the Sixth Amendment. A judge who engages in 
the § 3553(a) analysis must not only engage in the fact-finding required by the 
Guidelines, but she also must inquire more broadly into the facts and 
circumstances of the crime and the character and background of the offender. 
The judge must decide whether the Guidelines sentence is longer than 
necessary to protect the public from future crimes against the defendant, or 
whether the Guidelines sentence is long enough given the seriousness of the 
offense. These broad judgment calls are precisely the sort of nonfactual findings 
that the Cunningham Court indicated were the difference between a system that 
triggers the Sixth Amendment and one that does not.212 
In abandoning the independent-analysis requirement, the post-Booker 
cases have made judicial discretion, rather than individualized sentencing, the 
touchstone of the federal sentencing system. So long as a judge has the authority 
to engage in an independent analysis, it does not matter whether she actually 
engages in that analysis. Put differently, it is the availability of judicial 
 
 209. For example, in 2018 appellate courts affirmed sentencing decisions in appeals by defendants 
71.3% of the time and only revered in slightly more than 10% of appeals. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 156, at 180 tbl. A-2. The remaining appeals had mixed outcomes; they were 
reversed in part and affirmed in part. But when the government (as opposed to the defendant) appealed 
a district court sentencing decision, the outcome was dramatically different—only 24% of sentences 
were affirmed and more than 70% of sentences were reversed. Id. at 183 tbl. A-3. While there are clearly 
far more appeals by defendants than by the government, see id. at 180 tbl. A-2, 183 tbl. A-3 (recording 
3,224 appeals by defendants as compared to twenty-five appeals by the government), these figures 
demonstrate that appellate courts are far more likely to reverse a sentence that the government says is 
too lenient than a sentence that a defendant says is too harsh. 
 210. See supra note 201. 
 211. See supra Section II.C. 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 65–70. 
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discretion, rather than the exercise of that discretion, that the post-Booker Court 
has secured for defendants. 
A judge who fails to engage in an independent § 3553(a) analysis—that is, 
a judge who is not engaging in individualized sentencing—is continuing to 
apply the Guidelines no differently than in the pre-Booker system. When 
individual judges mechanically apply the Guidelines, and when litigants are told 
that arguments about why a Guidelines sentence is flawed are better directed to 
the Commission rather than to sentencing judges,213 then the defendants in 
those cases are in the same position as defendants under mandatory Guidelines. 
Put simply, the Guidelines are mandatory in their cases. 
Indeed, allowing district court judges to avoid any independent sentencing 
analysis also runs afoul of historical practice. As noted above, one of the few 
times that appellate courts would reverse a sentence on appeal was if a judge 
explicitly refused to engage in any individualized sentencing analysis and 
instead imposed a sentence based on the crime of conviction alone.214 Judges 
who do not engage with arguments about why a non-Guidelines sentence is 
appropriate seem no different than judges who refused to individualize 
sentences prior to the SRA. Given that the reason judges were historically 
permitted to engage in fact-finding was that the facts were deemed necessary to 
individualize sentences,215 the current failure to require individualization seems 
impossible to square with historical practice. 
B. Advisory Guidelines and Sixth Amendment Principles 
In addition to being at odds with sentencing history, advisory guidelines 
do not advance the two major interests that the Sixth Amendment protects—
the liberty interests of criminal defendants and democratic input in individual 
criminal cases.216 The Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants by 
 
 213. For example, the Seventh Circuit has declared that, when faced with defense arguments about 
why a Guidelines sentence is inappropriate, if a judge is “not persuaded by the argument, it may pass 
over it in silence.” United States v. Schmitz, 717 F.3d 536, 542 (7th Cir. 2013). The court noted that 
while judges may address arguments that challenge the policy wisdom of a Guidelines sentence, 
“[a]rguments urging a reexamination of a particular guideline are more naturally addressed to the 
Sentencing Commission.” Id. 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 202–05. 
 215. See Hessick & Berry, supra note 7, at 474–75. 
 216. The individual right is protected in the text of the Sixth Amendment, which reads: “In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
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in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.” Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. For more on the 
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99 N.C. L. REV. 1195 (2021) 
2021] THE SIXTH AMENDMENT SENTENCING RIGHT 1233 
making it more difficult to convict them of a crime.217 It accomplishes this by 
requiring a trial (which is expensive) in front of a jury (who may be more 
skeptical of government power than public officials) and by requiring that the 
defendant’s guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (a relatively high 
standard of proof). The Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine further protects 
defendants by ensuring that these protections apply to all facts that, by law, 
increase punishment.218 
The Sixth Amendment does more than just secure individual rights for 
defendants; it also serves a structural purpose. It allocates certain powers to the 
jury—the power to convict—and those powers serve as a check on the three 
branches of government.219 Criminal juries obviously serve as a check on the 
executive’s power to enforce the law—after all, the executive cannot punish 
anyone without convincing a jury to convict—but they also can limit the 
legislature’s power by refusing to convict under unjust laws.220 And while judges 
have the power to enter the judgment of conviction, they cannot do so in the 
absence of a guilty verdict from the jury or a guilty plea from the defendant. 
The structural check provided by the Sixth Amendment is important, the 
Founding generation explained, because it provides a democratic check on 
government officials.221 Voting provides a check at the wholesale level—
allowing voters to select and reject the officials who make and enforce our laws. 
Juries provide a check at the retail level—allowing voters to accept or reject 
government decisions to punish in individual criminal cases.222 That retail-level 
check is extremely important for democracy. Thomas Jefferson once said that, 
if he had to choose between democratic participation in the legislature and 
democratic participation in the judicial branch in the form of juries, he would 
choose juries.223 
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In theory, both of these concepts—protecting defendants and providing a 
democratic check—are important. In practice however, modern American juries 
rarely serve either purpose. Plea bargains, rather than jury trials, are the 
dominant method of resolving cases.224 Fewer than five percent of defendants 
convicted of a crime in this country are found guilty by a jury—and that number 
is even lower in some jurisdictions.225 The remaining defendants plead guilty. 
To be sure, things would be worse in the absence of the Sixth Amendment 
sentencing doctrine. Without the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine, 
legislatures could make jury trials even less important. They could create an 
entire criminal code that applied only at sentencing and limit the right to a jury 
and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt only to trivial allegations of 
wrongdoing. As the Supreme Court explained in Blakely, without the Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine, 
the jury need only find whatever facts the legislature chooses to label 
elements of the crime, and that those it labels sentencing factors—no 
matter how much they may increase the punishment—may be found by 
the judge. This would mean, for example, that a judge could sentence a 
man for committing murder even if the jury convicted him only of 
illegally possessing the firearm used to commit it—or of making an illegal 
lane change while fleeing the death scene.226 
Not only could judges make these other determinations, but they could use a 
lower standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine gives defendants the right—
at least on paper—to demand a jury trial on every disputed fact, including those 
that the legislature would rather label sentencing factors.227 And if they decide 
to plea bargain, then in theory the defendants will be able to negotiate a better 
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bargain because treating sentencing facts as elements gives them more 
bargaining power.228 In practice, however, we find that prosecutors have 
overwhelming leverage, defendants have insufficient information, and real 
people do not behave as economic models predict.229 
That the Supreme Court allows defendants to so easily waive their Sixth 
Amendment rights in plea bargaining significantly diminishes the role of juries 
as a democratic check on public officials. And because the Court allows 
prosecutors to pressure and threaten defendants to waive their right to a jury 
trial—behavior that the courts would never permit if other constitutional rights 
were at risk230—the Sixth Amendment sentencing right does not provide much 
protection for individual defendants either. To be clear, these are problems 
associated with the Court’s plea-bargaining doctrine, not its sentencing 
doctrine. But the Court’s plea-bargaining doctrine effectively renders its Sixth 
Amendment sentencing doctrine moot. 
The irony of plea bargaining undermining the Sixth Amendment 
sentencing doctrine is that the remedial majority in Booker relied on the 
prevalence of plea bargaining in refusing to remedy the Sixth Amendment 
violation by requiring the prosecution to prove all of the facts required by the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.231 The 
remedial majority thought that plea bargaining over sentencing facts would lead 
to less uniformity in sentencing, and it was probably correct that sentencing 
disparity would result from plea bargaining over sentencing facts. But again, 
that is a problem with the Court’s plea-bargaining doctrine, which largely defers 
to prosecutorial charging decisions and which does not contemplate any 
significant judicial review of plea-bargaining negotiations.232 Consequently, 
plea bargaining already results in all sorts of disparity, and this disparity has 
significant effects on sentencing decisions.233 
Irony aside, it is hard to understand how the Court could possibly seek to 
strike a balance between the right to a jury trial and a desire to achieve uniform 
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results in the criminal justice system. Juries are not well designed to provide 
uniformity; they are made up of laypeople who sit for only one case at a time. 
And juries have long been criticized for their lack of predictability and 
uniformity.234 When it comes to jury verdicts, we see inconsistent results not 
only across juries but sometimes even within a single jury’s verdicts.235 
But the question we need to ask is not whether the Court can balance 
uniformity and the right to a jury trial. Given the path that the Court took in 
Booker, attempting that balance is unavoidable. Instead, we must ask how much 
the Justices can (and should) tilt that balance in favor of uniformity. At present, 
it seems as though the Court may be on a path that tilts the balance just short 
of reinstating mandatory Guidelines.236 But perhaps that tilt could be arrested—
and perhaps some modicum of balance could be restored—if we assess the 
Court’s “subsequent calibration” of the remedy against the backdrop of the 
principles underlying the right to a jury trial. 
Even without looking at how the Court has privileged the Guidelines in 
its post-Booker cases, it is important to note that restoring judicial discretion 
does not obviously further either of the principles behind the jury trial right. It 
does not make it more difficult to punish defendants—judges can impose 
harsher sentences without finding any additional facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Nor is there is any democratic input into the sentencing decisions in 
individual cases because juries are excluded. 
One could argue that increased judicial sentencing discretion is likely to 
lead to more carefully drafted criminal codes with narrower sentencing ranges—
a result that could inject democratic input into sentencing decisions during the 
legislative process. The people, through their elected legislators, determine 
what punishment range ought to correspond to a particular crime. Because the 
voting public knows that a judge is empowered to impose the maximum 
sentence upon a finding of guilt, so the argument goes, legislatures will only 
enact statutes with maximum authorized punishment that is appropriate upon 
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a bare finding of guilt rather than based upon additional aggravating factors.237 
Instead, aggravating factors will be identified as elements of new, aggravated 
crimes with harsher sentencing ranges. And those elements will have to be 
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
But there are reasons to doubt that judicial sentencing discretion will lead 
to the legislative choices described above. Even before the rise of structured 
sentencing, plenty of states enacted statutes with broad sentencing ranges that 
empowered judges rather than juries.238 
Even if we were to assume that (a) judicial sentencing discretion is likely 
to lead to more carefully drafted criminal codes with narrower sentencing ranges 
and (b) such a criminal code would empower juries, an “advisory” system 
changes that dynamic. “Advisory” sentencing systems actually incentivize 
legislatures to move important factual determinations out of the domain of 
juries and into the domain of judges. So long as legislatures are willing to endure 
some deviation from their judges, they are able to relabel elements as 
“sentencing factors” and dramatically increase the punishment associated with 
those facts by having judges make factual findings at sentencing. 
“Advisory” sentencing guidelines also make voters less likely to check their 
legislatures. Imagine, for example, a state that punishes burglary by up to ten 
years’ imprisonment, but it “advises” judges that they should only impose a five-
year sentence unless the defendant possessed a gun during the burglary, and 
then it also makes reversal on appeal far more likely if the judge does not find 
that the defendant possessed a gun. The voting public knows that a judge has 
the authority to impose ten years in prison based only on a defendant’s 
commission of a burglary. But they also know that judges are probably only 
going to impose a ten-year sentence on a burglar if he also possessed a gun. The 
voting public will likely approve of such legislation if they think that burglars 
should receive five-year sentences, and armed burglars should receive ten-year 
sentences. That some unarmed burglars may receive ten-year sentences does 
not change the fact that this “advisory” sentencing system has effectively 
recategorized an element of a crime that ought to be found by a jury (possession 
of a gun) as a sentencing factor that will be found by a judge. 
Importantly, to the extent that the Court has “subsequently calibrated” the 
Booker remedy,239 it has done so in a way that exacerbates these problems. It has 
failed to clarify whether district courts have unfettered authority to sentence 
outside of the Guidelines range based only on their policy views, encouraged 
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appellate courts to curtail sentencing discretion and funnel cases within the 
Guidelines range, and refused to require district judges to engage in any 
independent sentencing analysis. Each of these developments make district 
court judges more likely to impose Guidelines sentences. And the more likely 
judges are to follow the Guidelines, the more of an incentive there is to move 
important sentencing distinctions out of statutory elements and into the 
Guidelines. 
One might argue that a defendant in an advisory system is no worse off 
than a defendant in a system of broad judicial sentencing discretion; in the latter 
system, a judge is unlikely to impose the maximum sentence on defendants 
unless there are some aggravating facts present. The advisory system might 
even be preferable, one might argue, because it identifies ex ante the facts that 
defendants ought to dispute at sentencing and it better ensures that defendants 
are treated similarly to one another. But those arguments do not explain why 
judges ought to be finding those sentencing facts, rather than juries; nor do those 
arguments address the fundamental Sixth Amendment objection—that advisory 
sentencing systems are designed precisely to avoid having juries decide those 
facts that the legislature has identified as deserving of additional punishment. 
Indeed, giving this advisory system a constitutional pass only makes sense 
if you actually want these advisory sentencing facts to drive sentences and if 
you also want to avoid juries. 
CONCLUSION 
The right that the Supreme Court first recognized in Apprendi was very 
important. Legislatures across the country had adopted structured sentencing 
decisions that moved consequential decisions from the guilt phase of a criminal 
case to the sentencing phase—a move that deprived defendants of both their 
right to a jury trial and their right to have facts found beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Despite the importance of the Sixth Amendment sentencing right, the 
exercise of jury-trial rights has not actually increased. Part of the problem is 
that the Supreme Court is unwilling to revisit its plea-bargaining doctrine, 
which empowers prosecutors to pressure defendants into guilty pleas and which 
shields that pressure from judicial review. But the Sixth Amendment sentencing 
doctrine itself—in particular the remedy that the Court adopted in Booker—is 
also partially to blame. That remedy, especially as it has been modified in more 
recent cases, substantially undercuts the right itself and permits practices that 
appear to be forbidden by the early cases establishing the right. 
The Court should, once again, recalibrate its Sixth Amendment sentencing 
remedy in a way that does not continue to privilege the Guidelines. It should 
look to historical practice and the interests underlying the Sixth Amendment to 
further refine the Booker remedy. In particular, it should acknowledge that 
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district courts are fully empowered to sentence outside of the Guidelines range 
based only on policy disagreement, it should scale back appellate review of 
sentencing decisions so that appellate courts only reverse excessively harsh 
sentences, and it should require district court judges to explicitly grapple with 
sentencing factors other than the Guidelines. Until and unless the Court does 
so, the remedy for Sixth Amendment sentencing violations will continue to 
undermine the Sixth Amendment sentencing right. 
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